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Abstract
We present different constructions for nonprioritized belief revision, that is, belief changes in
which the input sentences are not always accepted. First, we present the concept of explanation in
a deductive way. Second, we define multiple revision operators with respect to sets of sentences
(representing explanations), giving representation theorems. Finally, we relate the formulated
operators with argumentative systems and default reasoning frameworks.
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1. Introduction
Belief Revision systems are logical frameworks for modelling the dynamics of
knowledge. That is, how we modify our beliefs when we receive new information. The
main problem arises when that information is inconsistent with the beliefs that represent
our epistemic state. For instance, suppose we believe that a Ferrari coupe is the fastest car
and then we found out that some Porsche cars are faster than any Ferrari cars. Surely, we
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need to revise our beliefs in order to accept the new information while preserving as much
of the old information as possible.
One of the most controversial properties of the revision operators is success. Success
specifies that the new information has primacy over the beliefs of an agent. In this work
we propose a kind of non-prioritized revision operator in which the new information is
supported by an explanation. Every explanation contains an explanans (the beliefs that
support a conclusion) and an explanandum (the final conclusion). Each explanation is a
set of sentences with some restrictions. The operators we propose, which are defined upon
belief bases, are an intermediate model between semi-revision operator [14] and merge
operator [6]. Moreover, we present a close connection between these new operators and
frameworks for default reasoning. The idea is that the beliefs to be deleted in a belief base
could be preserved in an alternate set as defeasible rules or assumptions.
There are many different frameworks for belief revision but AGM [1] is the one which
has received the most attention. Most others rely on the foundations of AGM. They present
an epistemic model (the formalism in which the beliefs will be represented) and then
they define different kinds of operators. The basic representation of epistemic states is
through belief sets (sets of sentences closed under logical consequence) or belief bases
(sets of sentences not necessarily closed). Each operator may be presented in two ways: by
giving an explicit construction (algorithm) for the operator, or by giving a set of rationality
postulates to be satisfied. Rationality postulates determine constraints that the operators
should satisfy. They treat the operators as black boxes; after receiving certain inputs (of
new information) we know what the response will be, but not the internal mechanisms
used.
The operators for change use selection functions to determine which beliefs will be
erased from the epistemic state. Partial meet contractions (AGM framework) are based
on a selection among subsets of the original set that do not imply the information to be
retracted. The kernel contraction approach is based on a selection among the sentences
that imply the information to be retracted. Revision operators can be defined through Levi
identity; in order to revise an epistemic state with respect to a sentence α, we contract with
respect to ¬α and then expand the new epistemic state with respect to α.
1.1. On the use of explanations
The role of explanations in knowledge representation has been widely studied in [3,7,
17,18,27]. We can motivate the use of explanations with an example. Suppose that Michael
believes that (α) all birds fly and that (β) Tweety is a bird. Thus, he will believe that (δ)
Tweety flies. Then, Johana tells him that Tweety does not fly. As a consequence, Michael
will have to drop the belief in α or the belief in β forced by having to drop δ. However, it
does not seem like a rational attitude to incorporate any external belief without pondering it.
Usually, an intelligent agent demands an explanation supporting the provided information.
Even more so if that information contradicts its own set of beliefs. Being rational, Michael
will demand an explanation for the belief ¬δ. For instance, Johana accompanies her
contention of Tweety does not fly with the sentences Tweety does not fly because it is a
penguin and penguins are birds but they do not fly. Perhaps convinced, Michael would
have to check his beliefs in order to determine whether he believes Tweety flies.
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The main role of an explanation is to rationalize facts. At the base of each explanation
rests a why-question [22]: “Why does Tweety not fly?”, “Why did he say what he did?”,
“Why is it raining?”. We think that a rational agent, before incorporating a new belief that
contradicts its knowledge, demands an explanation for the provided information by means
of a why-question. Then, if the explanation resists the discussion, the new belief, or its
explanation, or both are incorporated into the knowledge.
1.2. The belief revision framework
Since explanations are a major instrument for producing rational belief changes, they
should be representable in belief revision theory. Unfortunately, AGM theory [1,7], the
dominant framework for belief revision, does not seem to allow for an account of
explanations, and the same applies to most other frameworks of belief revision that we
are aware of.
The reason for this is that an explanation should be capable of inducing belief in
a statement that would not be accepted without the explanation; when faced with a
statement α, the epistemic agent does not believe in it, but if an explanation A is provided,
then he or she will acquire belief in α. This simple feature cannot be modelled in the AGM
framework for the simple reason that it only contains two mechanisms for the receipt of
new information—expansion and revision—both of which satisfy the success postulate
according to which the input information is always accepted.
In our opinion, a better account of explanation can be obtained with a semi-revision
operator (non-prioritized belief revision operator). By this, we mean an operator that
sometimes accepts the new information and sometimes rejects it. If the new information is
accepted, then deletions from the old information are made if this is necessary to maintain
consistency. A wide treatment of non-prioritized revision operators on belief sets can be
found in [15].
We will adopt a propositional languageLwith a complete set of boolean connectives:¬,
∧, ∨, →, ↔. Formulæ in L will be denoted by lowercase Greek characters: α,β, δ, . . . ,ω.
Sets of sentences in L will be denoted by uppercase Latin characters: A,B,C, . . . ,Z.
The symbol  represents a tautology or truth. The symbol ⊥ represents a contradiction or
falsum. The characters γ and σ will be reserved to represent selection functions for change
operators. We also use a consequence operator Cn. Cn takes sets of sentences in L and
produces new sets of sentences. The operator Cn satisfies inclusion (A⊆ Cn(A)), iteration
(Cn(A) = Cn(Cn(A))), and monotony (if A ⊆ B then Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(B)). We will assume
that the consequence operator includes classical consequences and verifies the standard
properties of supraclassicality (if α can be derived from A by deduction in classical
logic, then α ∈ Cn(A)), deduction (β ∈ Cn(A ∪ {α}) if and only if (α → β) ∈ Cn(A))
and compactness (if α ∈ Cn(A) then α ∈ Cn(A′) for some finite subset A′ of A). To
simplify notation, we write Cn(α) for Cn({α}) where α is any sentence in L. We also
write α ∈ Cn(A) as A  α.
Let K be a set of sentences. As in the AGM framework, we will assume three different
epistemic attitudes: accepted (whenever α ∈ Cn(K)), rejected (whenever ¬α ∈ Cn(K))
and undetermined (whenever α /∈ Cn(K) and ¬α /∈ Cn(K)).
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2. Explanations in the belief revision framework
In order to present a revision operator based on explanations, we will first define an
explanation. An explanation contains two main parts: an explanans, that is, the beliefs that
support a conclusion, and an explanandum, that is, the final conclusion of the explanans.
We will use a set of sentences as the explanans and a single sentence as the explanandum.
Definition 1. The set A is an explanation for the sentence α if and only if the following
properties are satisfied:
(1) Deduction: A α.
(2) Consistency: A ⊥.
(3) Minimality: If B⊂A then B  α.
(4) Informational Content: Cn(A) Cn(α).
The relation A explains α will be noted as A α.
Deduction determines that the explanans implies the explanandum. Consistency averts
the possibility that a conclusion be derived from an inconsistent set. Minimality establishes
that there are no irrelevant beliefs in the explanans. Informational content precludes
that the explanandum would imply every sentence in the explanans (for example, A =
{α ∨ β,α ∨ ¬β} is not an explanation for α because Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(α)). Moreover,
informational content precludes that a single sentence could be an explanation for itself
(this means that it is not the case that {α} α for any sentence α).
In dialogues between two agents it is very common that an agent does not fully accept
the information provided by the other. Moreover, it is typical that an agent accepts the new
information partially. So, we will define a revision operator of non-prioritized revision in
order to capture this behavior. Other work related to partial acceptance was formulated by
Fermé and Hansson [4].
Now we will present postulates for a revision operator by a set of sentences. We will
extend the framework in [14] to allow for multiple inputs, i.e., for sets of sentences
(explanations) as input. Therefore, our operator will be a function that takes us from two
sets of sentences to a new set of sentences. We will assume that A is a set of sentences. Let
K be a set of sentences and “◦” a revision operator. We propose the following postulates:1
Inclusion: K◦A⊆K ∪A.
This postulate establishes that, if an agent revises its belief base K with respect to
a set A, then its new stock of beliefs will be contained in the union of K and A.
Vacuity: If K ∪A ⊥ then K◦A=K ∪A.
This postulate establishes that if the input set A is consistent with the original
beliefs K , then the revised belief base is equal to the union of K and A.
1 Core Retainment and Relevance have been modified from Hansson’s works [11,13] to be used in our
formalism. Similarly, Congruence has been modified from Fuhrmann’s work [6].
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Vacuity 2: If A⊆K and K ⊥ then K◦A=K .
This postulate determines that if the input set is already included in a consistent
belief base K , then the revised belief base is equal to K .
Weak success: If K ∪A ⊥ then A⊆K◦A.
This postulate says that A is included in the revised belief base whenever A is
consistent with K .
Stability: If A⊆K and K ⊥ then A⊆K◦A.
This postulate says that A is included in the revised belief base whenever A is
already included in K and K is consistent.
Consistency: If A ⊥ then K◦A ⊥.
This postulate is equivalent to consistency postulate of the AGM model, in which
the revised set is consistent if the input set is consistent.
Consistency preservation: If K ⊥ then K◦A ⊥.
This postulate ensures that the revised belief base is consistent whenever the
original belief base is consistent.
Strong consistency: K◦A ⊥.
This postulate ensures consistency in the revised belief base.
Core retainment: If α ∈ (K ∪A) \ (K◦A) then there is a set H such that H ⊆ (K ∪A),
H is consistent but H ∪ {α} is inconsistent.
This postulate expresses the intuition that nothing is removed from the union
of the original belief base and the input set unless its removal in some way
contributes to making the new belief base consistent.
Relevance: If α ∈ (K ∪A) \ (K◦A) then there is a set H such that K◦A⊆H ⊆ (K ∪A),
H is consistent but H ∪ {α} is inconsistent.
This postulate is a stronger version of core retainment and we will use it to
characterize some kinds of revision operators.
Congruence: If K ∪A=K ∪B then K◦A=K◦B .
This postulate expresses that if A joined with K is equal to B joined with K then
the revision with respect to A is equal to the revision with respect to B .
Fairness: If the condition that A ⊥, B ⊥ and for all H ⊆K holds that (H ∪A)  ⊥
if and only if (H ∪B) ⊥, then (K ∪A) \ (K◦A)= (K ∪B) \ (K◦B).
This postulate establishes that, if any subset H of K is inconsistent with a
consistent set A if and only if it is inconsistent with a consistent set B , then
the sentences erased in the respective revisions with respect to A and B are the
same.
Reversion: If K ∪ A and K ∪ B have the same minimally inconsistent subsets then
(K ∪A) \ (K◦A)= (K ∪B) \ (K◦B).
This postulate establishes that, if K ∪A and K ∪ B contain the same minimally
inconsistent subsets then the sentences erased in the respective revisions with
respect to A and B are the same.
Weak monotony: If A⊆ B and K ∪B ⊥ then K◦A⊆K◦B .
This postulate establishes that if a set B contains a subset A and B is consistent
with K , then the revision of K with respect to A will be contained in the revision
of K with respect to B .
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Proposition 2. Some interesting relations among postulates:
(1) If “◦” satisfies relevance then it satisfies core retainment.
(2) If “◦” satisfies strong consistency then it satisfies consistency and consistency
preservation.
(3) If “◦” satisfies inclusion and core retainment then it satisfies vacuity.
(4) If “◦” satisfies inclusion and reversion then it satisfies congruence.
(5) If “◦” satisfies vacuity then it satisfies weak success.
(6) If “◦” satisfies inclusion and vacuity then it satisfies weak monotony.
(7) If “◦” satisfies inclusion and fairness then it satisfies weak monotony.
(8) If “◦” satisfies vacuity then it satisfies vacuity 2.
Proof. (1) Straightforward.
(2) Straightforward.
(3) Let K ∪ A ⊥. We must show that K◦A= K ∪ A. By inclusion K◦A ⊆ K ∪ A.
It remains to show that K ∪ A ⊆ K◦A. Suppose, to the contrary, that K ∪ A  K◦A.
That is, there is some α such that α ∈ K ∪ A but α /∈K◦A. Then α ∈ (K ∪A) \ (K◦A).
By core retainment there is a set H such that H ⊆ K ∪ A, H  ⊥ but H ∪ {α}  ⊥.
Since α ∈ K ∪ A and H ⊆ K ∪ A then H ∪ {α} ⊆ K ∪ A. Therefore, K ∪ A  ⊥. This
contradiction establishes the claim.
(4) Let K ∪A=K ∪B . Then K ∪A and K ∪B have the same minimally inconsistent
subsets. From reversion we have that (K ∪A) \ (K◦A)= (K ∪B) \ (K◦B). We need to
show that K◦A=K◦B .
Assume, to the contrary, that K◦A = K◦B . That is, there is a sentence α ∈ K◦A
and α /∈ K◦B . From inclusion it follows that α ∈ K ∪ A. Since K ∪ A = K ∪ B then
α /∈ (K ∪A) \ (K◦A) and α ∈ (K ∪B) \ (K◦B). This contradiction establishes the claim.
(5) Straightforward.
(6) Let A⊆ B and K ∪B ⊥. We must show that K◦A⊆K◦B . By inclusion we have
that K◦A⊆K ∪A. Since “◦” satisfies vacuity then K ∪B ⊥ implies that K◦B =K ∪B .
Since K ∪A⊆K ∪B then K◦A⊆K◦B and we are done.
(7) Let A ⊆ B and K ∪ B  ⊥. We must show that K◦A ⊆ K◦B . Assume, to the
contrary, that K◦AK◦B . Then there is a sentence α such that α ∈K◦A and α /∈K◦B .
By inclusion if α ∈K◦A then α ∈K ∪A. Since A⊆ B then α ∈K ∪ B . Then α ∈K◦A,
α ∈ K ∪ A, α /∈ K◦B and α ∈ K ∪ B . That means that α /∈ (K ∪ A) \ (K◦A) and
α ∈ (K ∪ B) \ (K◦B). Therefore (K ∪ A) \ (K◦A) = (K ∪ B) \ (K◦B). From the
hypothesis we have that K ∪ A  ⊥. Therefore, for all H ⊆ K we have that H ∪ A  ⊥
and H ∪ B  ⊥. By fairness (K ∪ A) \ (K◦A) = (K ∪ B) \ (K◦B). This contradiction
establishes the claim.
(8) Let A ⊆ K and K  ⊥. We must show that K◦A = K . Since A ⊆ K and K  ⊥
then K ∪A ⊥. By vacuity K◦A=K ∪A. Since A⊆K then K◦A=K ∪A=K . ✷
The above properties are proposed as basic requirements for an account of explanation
in a belief revision framework. The mechanism of a revision operator by a set of sentences
with partial acceptance is:
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(1) The input set A is initially accepted.
(2) All possible inconsistencies of K ∪A are removed.
This operator is an operator of external revision. The name “external” indicates that
the revision process takes place outside of the original set. We can see that there is an
intermediate stage in which the epistemic state can be inconsistent.
The operator we will define is an intermediate form between two nonprioritized revision
operators: semi-revision and merge. Semi-revision is a nonprioritized revision operator
proposed by Hansson [14] that allows the revision of a set K with respect to a single
sentence α. On the other hand, a merge operator was presented by Fuhrmann [6] and it
allows the revision of two arbitrary sets of sentences.
2.1. Kernel revision by a set of sentences
The first construction of revision by a set of sentences is based on the concept of a kernel
set.
Definition 3 (Hansson [12]). Let K be a set of sentences and α a sentence. Then K⊥⊥α is
the set of all K ′ such that K ′ ∈K⊥⊥α if and only if K ′ ⊆K , K ′  α, and if K ′′ ⊂K ′ then
K ′′  α. The set K⊥⊥α is called the kernel set, and its elements are called the α-kernels
of K .
For instance, if K = {p,p→ q, r, r→ s, r ∧ s→ q, t→ u} then the set of q-kernels is
equal to {{p,p→ q}, {r, r→ s, r ∧ s→ q}}. If K = {p,p→ q} then K⊥⊥(p→ p)= {∅}
because p→ p ∈ Cn(∅) and K⊥⊥¬p = ∅ since K ¬p.
In order to define the operator of revision by a set of sentences we need to use an incision
function. This function selects sentences to be removed and it is called incision function
because it makes an incision in every ⊥-kernel. However, this function is not only applied
to K . It is also applied to supersets of K . Therefore, we need an external incision function
for K .
Definition 4. Let K be a set of sentences. An external incision function for K is a function
“σ ”(σ : 22L ⇒ 2L) such that for any set A⊆ L, the following hold:
(1) σ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥)⊆⋃((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥).
(2) If X ∈ (K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥ and X = ∅ then (X ∩ σ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥)) = ∅.
The limit case in which (K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥= ∅ then σ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥)= ∅.
For instance, taking K = {t, u, r, r → s} and A = {¬t, p,p → ¬s} then K ∪ A =
{t, u, r, r→ s,¬t, p,p→¬s}, (K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥= {{r, r→ s,p,p→¬s}, {t,¬t}}, and some
possible results of σ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥) are {p, t}, {p,¬t} and {p→¬s, t}.
Formally, we define the kernel revision by a set of sentences as follows.
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Definition 5. Let K and A be sets of sentences and “σ ” an external incision function for K .
The operator “◦” of kernel revision by a set of sentences (◦ : 2L× 2L⇒ 2L) is defined as
K◦A= (K ∪A) \ σ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥).
The mechanism of this operator is to add A to K and then eliminate from the result
all possible inconsistency by means of an incision function that makes a “cut” over each
minimally inconsistent subset of K ∪A. Since this operator uses an incision function and
the set of ⊥-kernels, we call it kernel revision by a set of sentences.
An axiomatic characterization can now be given for this kind of operator.
Theorem 6. Let K be a belief base. The operator “◦” is a kernel revision by a set
of sentences if and only if it satisfies inclusion, strong consistency, core retainment and
reversion.
Proof. [CONSTRUCTION TO POSTULATES] Let “◦σ ” be a kernel revision by a set of
sentences for K . We must show that “◦σ ” satisfies the postulates enumerated in the
theorem. Let K◦σA= (K ∪A) \ (σ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥)).
Inclusion: Straightforward from the definition.
Strong consistency: Since all sets in (K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥ are minimally inconsistent, and σ cuts
every set in it, then (K ∪A) \ σ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥) is consistent.
Core retainment: Suppose that α ∈ (K ∪ A) \ (K◦σA). That is, α ∈ K ∪ A and α /∈
K◦σA. Then α ∈ σ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥⊥). Since σ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥⊥) ⊆⋃((K ∪ A)⊥⊥⊥)
there is some X such that α ∈ X and X ∈ (K ∪ A)⊥⊥⊥. Let Y = X \ {α}. Then
there is some Y such that Y ⊆ (K ∪A), Y ⊥ but Y ∪ {α}  ⊥. Therefore, core
retainment is satisfied.
Reversion: Suppose that K ∪A and K ∪B have the same minimally inconsistent subsets.
That means that (K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥= (K ∪B)⊥⊥⊥. Since σ is a well defined function
then σ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥)= σ((K ∪B)⊥⊥⊥). We need to show that
(K ∪A) \ (K◦σA)= (K ∪B) \ (K◦σB).
(⊆) If α ∈ (K ∪ A) \ (K◦σA) then, by definition of “◦”, α ∈ σ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥⊥).
Since σ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥⊥)= σ((K ∪ B)⊥⊥⊥) then α ∈ K ∪ B and α /∈K◦σB .
Therefore, (K ∪A) \ (K◦σA)⊆ (K ∪B) \ (K◦σB).
(⊇) If α ∈ (K ∪ B) \ (K◦σB) then, by definition of “◦”, α ∈ σ((K ∪ B)⊥⊥⊥).
Since σ((K ∪ B)⊥⊥⊥)= σ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥⊥) then α ∈ K ∪ A and α /∈ K◦σA.
Therefore, (K ∪B) \ (K◦σB)⊆ (K ∪A) \ (K◦σA).
[POSTULATES TO CONSTRUCTION] We need to show that if an operator satisfies the
enumerated postulates then it is possible to build an operator in the way specified in the
theorem. Let “σ ” be a function such that, for every pair of sets K and A, it holds that:
σ
(
(K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥)= {α: α ∈ (K ∪A) \ (K◦A)}.
We must show:
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Part A.
(1) “σ ” is a well defined function.
That is, if A and B are sets of sentences such that (K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥= (K ∪B)⊥⊥⊥, we
must show that σ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥)= σ((K ∪B)⊥⊥⊥). From the hypothesis we have
that K ∪ A and K ∪ B have the same minimally inconsistent subsets. It follows
from reversion that (K ∪A) \ (K◦A)= (K ∪B) \ (K◦B). Therefore:
σ
(
(K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥) = {α: α ∈ (K ∪A) \ (K◦A)}
= {α: α ∈ (K ∪B) \ (K◦B)}
= σ ((K ∪B)⊥⊥⊥).
Therefore, “σ ” is well defined.
(2) σ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥)⊆⋃((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥).
Let α ∈ σ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥⊥). Then α ∈ (K ∪ A) \ (K◦A). Due to core retainment
there is some H such that H ⊆ (K ∪A), H ⊥ but H ∪{α}  ⊥. Since α ∈K ∪A
then there is a⊥-kernelK ′ in (K∪A) (i.e., there is a minimally inconsistent subset
of K ∪A) such that K ′ ⊆H ∪ {α} and α ∈K ′. Therefore, α ∈⋃((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥).
(3) If X ∈ (K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥ then (X ∩ σ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥)) = ∅.
Let X ∈ ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥⊥). We need to show that X ∩ σ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥⊥) = ∅. Due to
strong consistencyK◦A ⊥. SinceX ⊥we may conclude thatX K◦A. This
means that there is some β such that β ∈X and β /∈K◦A. Since X ⊆ (K∪A) then
β ∈ (K ∪A) \ (K◦A), i.e., β ∈ σ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥). So β ∈ (X ∩ σ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥⊥)).
Therefore, (X ∩ σ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥)) = ∅.
Part B: “◦σ ” is equal to “◦”.
Due to inclusion and from the definition of σ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥) we conclude that K◦A=
K◦σA. ✷
2.2. Partial meet revision by a set of sentences
The second construction of revision by a set of sentences is based on the concept of a
remainder set.
Definition 7 (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1]). Let K be a set of sentences and
α a sentence. Then K⊥α is the set of all K ′ such that K ′ ∈ K⊥α if and only if K ′ ⊆K ,
K ′  α and if K ′ ⊂K ′′ ⊆K then K ′′  α. The set K⊥α is called the remainder set of K
with respect to α, and its elements are called the α-remainders of K .
For instance, if K = {p,p → q, r, r → s, r ∧ s → q, t → u} then the set of q-
remainders is {{p → q, r → s, r ∧ s → q, t → u}, {p, r → s, r ∧ s → q, t → u},
{p→ q, r, r ∧ s → q, t → u}, {p, r, r ∧ s → q, t → u}}. The set of v-remainders of K
is equal to {K} since K  v. The set of (p→ p)-remainders of K is ∅ because p→ p ∈
Cn(∅) and there is no subset of K failing to imply p→ p.
In order to define the partial meet version of this operator, we need an external selection
function, that is, a selection function to be applied over supersets of K .
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Definition 8. Let K be a set of sentences. An external selection function for K is a
function “γ ” (γ : 22L ⇒ 22L ) such that for any set A⊆ L, it holds that:
(1) γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥)⊆ (K ∪A)⊥⊥.
(2) γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥) = ∅.
Since every set H contains a consistent subset then H⊥⊥ is always non-empty. For
instance, if K = {p,q, r} and A= {¬p,¬q} then
K ∪A= {p,q, r,¬p,¬q},
(K ∪A)⊥⊥= {{p,q, r}, {¬p,q, r}, {p,¬q, r}, {¬p,¬q, r}}
and some possible results of γ ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥) are {{¬p,¬q, r}}, {{¬p,q, r}}, {{p,q, r},
{¬p,q, r}} and {{p,q, r}, {¬p,q, r}, {p,¬q, r}}.
Definition 9. Let K be a set of sentences and γ an external selection function for K . Then
γ is an equitable selection function for K if (K ∪ A)⊥⊥⊥ = (K ∪ B)⊥⊥⊥ implies that
(K ∪A) \⋂γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥)= (K ∪B) \⋂γ ((K ∪B)⊥⊥).
The intuition behind this definition is that, if the set of minimally inconsistent subsets
of K ∪A is equal to the set of minimally inconsistent subsets of K ∪ B then α is erased
in the selection of ⊥-remainders of K ∪ A if and only if it is erased in the selection of
⊥-remainders of K ∪B .
For example, let K = {a, b,¬c}, A= {¬b, c, d, e} and B = {¬b, c, f }. Then:
(K ∪A)⊥⊥= {{a, b, c, d, e}, {a,¬b, c, d, e}, {a, b,¬c, d, e}, {a,¬b,¬c, d, e}},
(K ∪B)⊥⊥= {{a, b, c, f }, {a,¬b, c, f }, {a, b,¬c, f }, {a,¬b,¬c, f }}.
We have (K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥= (K ∪B)⊥⊥⊥= {{b,¬b}, {c,¬c}}. Suppose that γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥)=
{{a, b, c, d, e}, {a,¬b, c, d, e}}. That is, γ selects only ⊥-remainders containing c.
If γ is an equitable selection function γ ((K ∪ B)⊥⊥) must be equal to {{a, b, c, f },
{a,¬b, c, f }}.
Formally, we define the operator of partial meet revision by a set of sentences as follows.
Definition 10. Let K and A be sets of sentences and “γ ” an equitable selection function
for K . The operator “◦” of partial meet revision by a set of sentences (◦ : 2L× 2L⇒ 2L)
is defined as K◦A=⋂γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥).
The mechanism of this operator is to add A to K and then eliminate from the result all
possible inconsistencies by means of an equitable selection function that makes a choice
among the maximally consistent subsets of K ∪A and intersect them. Since this operator
uses a selection function and the remainder set, we call it partial meet revision by a set of
sentences.
The following lemma will be used in the representation theorem of partial meet revision
by a set of sentences.
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Lemma 11. If A⊥⊥= B⊥⊥ then A= B .
Proof.
(⊆) Let A⊥⊥ = B⊥⊥ and let α ∈ A. Then there is an X ∈ A⊥⊥ with α ∈ X. From the
presupposition, X ∈B⊥⊥ too, in particular, X⊆ B; so also α ∈ B . Therefore A⊆ B .
(⊇) Let B⊥⊥ = A⊥⊥ and let α ∈ B . Then there is an X ∈ B⊥⊥ with α ∈ X. From
the presupposition, X ∈ A⊥⊥ too, in particular, X ⊆ A; so also α ∈ A. Therefore
B ⊆A. ✷
Thus, an axiomatic characterization can now be given for an operator of partial meet
revision by a set of sentences.
Theorem 12. Let K be a belief base. The operator “◦” is a partial meet revision by a set of
sentences if and only if it satisfies inclusion, strong consistency, relevance and reversion.
Proof. [CONSTRUCTION TO POSTULATES] Let “◦γ ” be a partial meet revision by a set
of sentences for K . We must show that “◦γ ” satisfies the postulates enumerated in the
theorem. Let K◦γA=⋂γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥).
Inclusion: Straightforward from the definition.
Strong consistency: Since all sets in (K ∪A)⊥⊥ are consistent, so is their intersection.
Relevance: Suppose that α ∈ (K ∪ A) \ (K◦γA). That is, α ∈ K ∪ A and α /∈ K◦γ A.
Then α /∈⋂γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥). Since γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥)⊆ (K ∪A)⊥⊥ there is some
X such that α /∈ X and X ∈ γ ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥). Since ⋂γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥)⊆X then
K◦γA ⊆ X. Since α /∈ X then K◦γ A ⊆ X ⊆ K ∪ A, X  ⊥ but X ∪ {α}  ⊥.
Therefore, relevance is satisfied.
Reversion: Suppose that K ∪A and K ∪B have the same minimally inconsistent subsets,
that is, (K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥= (K ∪B)⊥⊥⊥. We need to show that (K ∪A) \ (K◦γA)=
(K ∪B) \ (K◦γ B). Straightforward since γ is an equitable selection function.
[POSTULATES TO CONSTRUCTION] We will show that if an operator satisfies the
enumerated postulates then it is possible to build an operator in the way specified in the
theorem. Let “γ ” be a function such that, for all pair of sets K and A, it holds that:
γ
(
(K ∪A)⊥⊥)= {X ∈ (K ∪A)⊥⊥: K◦A⊆X}.
We must show that:
Part A: “◦γ ” is equal to “◦”, i.e., ⋂γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥)=K◦A.
(⊇) It follows from the definition.
(⊆) Let α /∈K◦A. We must prove that α /∈⋂γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥). That is, we need to find
some X ∈ (K ∪A)⊥⊥ such that α /∈X. We have two cases:
(1) α ∈ K ∪ A: by relevance we have that there is some H such that K◦A ⊆
H ⊆ K ∪ A, H  ⊥ and H ∪ {α}  ⊥. From this we have that H  α. It is
12 M.A. Falappa et al. / Artificial Intelligence 141 (2002) 1–28
clear that we may extend the set H to a maximally consistent set H ′ such that
H ′ ∈ (K ∪A)⊥⊥ and α /∈H ′. Since K◦A⊆H ′ then H ′ ∈ γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥).
(2) α /∈K ∪A: then no set in (K ∪A)⊥⊥ will contain α.
Part B.
(1) “γ ” is a well defined function.
Let A and B be sets of sentences such that (K ∪A)⊥⊥= (K ∪ B)⊥⊥. We must
show that γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥)= γ ((K ∪B)⊥⊥). If (K ∪A)⊥⊥= (K ∪B)⊥⊥ then it
follows from Lemma 11 that K ∪A=K ∪B .
From Proposition 2 it follows that if inclusion and reversion hold then congruence
holds. Therefore, K◦A=K◦B and:
γ
(
(K ∪A)⊥⊥) = {X ∈ (K ∪A)⊥⊥: K◦A⊆X}
= {X ∈ (K ∪B)⊥⊥: K◦B ⊆X}
= γ ((K ∪B)⊥⊥).
That means that the function “γ ” is well defined.
(2) “γ ” is an equitable selection function.
First we will show that γ is an external selection function. That is to say that
∅ = γ ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥) ⊆ (K ∪ A)⊥⊥. By inclusion (K◦A) ⊆ (K ∪ A). Due to
strong consistency K◦A ⊥ and there is a subset of K ∪A which is consistent.
Hence, there must exist a set H between K◦A and K ∪ A which is maximally
consistent. Then H ∈ (K ∪ A)⊥⊥ and K◦A ⊆ H . Therefore, there exists an
H ∈ γ ((K ∪A)⊥⊥) and γ is an external selection function.
It remains to show that γ is an equitable selection function. Suppose that K ∪
A and K ∪ B have the same minimally inconsistent subsets. It follows from
reversion that (K ∪ A) \ (K◦A) = (K ∪ B) \ (K◦B). It follows from part A
that K◦A =⋂γ ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥) and K◦B =⋂γ ((K ∪ B)⊥⊥). Therefore γ is
an equitable selection function. ✷
Since relevance implies core retainment the following corollary is trivially shown.
Corollary 13. Each partial meet revision by a set of sentences operator is a kernel revision
by a set of sentences operator.
3. Relating revisions and explanations
In Section 2 we have introduced postulates for explanans (represented by a set of
sentences). Now we will present postulates that relate explanans to the corresponding
explanandum. Let K be a belief base, “◦” a revision operator by a set of sentences for K,A
and B explanans, and α a sentence of the language.
Explanans inclusion: If A α and A⊆K◦A then K◦A  α.
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This postulate establishes that if an agent receives an explanation for a sentence
and his belief base contains this explanation then the revised belief base derives
the explanandum.
Weak success 2: If A α and K ∪A ⊥ then K◦A  α.
This postulate expresses that, if an agent receives an explanation for some
sentence α and the sentences of the explanans are not rejected, then the
explanandum will be derived in the revised belief base.
Constrained success: If A α and K ¬α then K◦A  α.
This postulate establishes that if an agent receives an explanation for some
sentence α not rejected in the original belief base then the explanandum will be
accepted in the revised belief base.
Expansion: If A α and K  α then K◦A  α.
This postulate says that if an agent accepts a sentence α and then receives a new
explanation for it he/she will continue accepting the explained sentence.
It is interesting to note that, since explanations satisfy deduction, the acceptance of
the explanans forces the acceptance of the explanandum in the revised set. The following
proposition establishes this important relation.
Proposition 14. If “◦” is a revision operator by a set of sentences then it satisfies explanans
inclusion.
Proof. Suppose that we are revising (in kernel or partial meet mode) K by A and A α.
Since “” satisfies deduction then A  α. If A⊆K◦A then K◦A  α. ✷
There is an important fact to remark regarding the degree of acceptance of the explanans
and the explanandum. While the explanans can be explicitly included in the revised set, the
explanandum may be inferred from it without actually being included. This difference in
the degree of acceptance is motivated in the epistemic model adopted here which is based
on sets of sentences not necessarily closed as in the AGM model. For this reason, in each
belief base we will have two types of beliefs: basic or explicit beliefs, and inferred or
implicit beliefs.
The following proposition shows that the properties of constrained success and
expansion can not be expected to hold in general.
Proposition 15. If “◦” is an operator of revision by a set of sentences then in general it
does not satisfy neither constrained success nor expansion.
Proof. Let us consider an operation of partial meet revision by a set of sentences since it
is always a kernel revision by a set of sentences (Corollary 13).
Constrained success. Let p,q, r, s and t be logically independent propositions. Let
K = {p, s,p ∧ s →¬q, s → u} and A = {p,p → q, q → r} an explanation for r . It is
clear that K  ¬r . We will make a partial meet revision by a set of sentences of K with
respect to A. That is, we need to make a selection among the best maximally consistent
subsets of K ∪A: (K ∪A)⊥⊥= {K1,K2,K3} where:
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K1 = {p, s,p ∧ s→¬q, s→ u,q→ r}.
K2 = {p, s, s→ u,p→ q, q→ r}.
K3 = {s,p ∧ s→¬q, s→ u,p→ q, q→ r}.
Suppose that K1 and K2 are the preferred sets. Then the outcome of the partial meet
revision by a set of sentences is K◦A= {p, s, s→ u,q→ r}. It is clear that K◦A  r .
Expansion. Let p, q and r be logically independent propositions. Let K = {p,
p→ q, r} and A = {¬r,¬r → q}. It is clear that K  q and A q . We need to make
a selection among the maximally consistent subsets of K ∪ A. (K ∪ A)⊥⊥ = {K1,K2}
where K1 = {p,p→ q, r,¬r→ q} and K2 = {p,p→ q,¬r,¬r→ q}. If we select both
sets then K◦A is {p, r,¬r → q}, which does not imply q . ✷
4. Extending the representation language
Now we will present some applications of the operator of revision by a set of sentences.
We will assume a representation language that is more expressive than a propositional one.
Most frameworks used and defined for belief revision use mainly a propositional language
or an extension of it. We will define a language L+ which is a subset of a first order logic.
Let L+ be the extended knowledge representation language with the same logic
connectives used in L. This language is defined recursively by means of the following
BNF grammar:
term ::= variable | constant
list-of-terms ::= term | term “, ” list-of-terms
wff-atomic ::= predicate “(” list-of-terms “)”
wff-free ::= wff-atomic | “¬” wff-free | wff-free “→ ” wff-free
wff-free “∧ ” wff-free | wff-free “∨ ” wff-free
wff ::= “(” “∀” variable“)” wff | wff-free
Our extended language is first order without functional symbols and without explicit
existential quantifiers. The symbols between quotation marks are assumed as symbols in
the object language (i.e., they are not meta-symbols). All sentences will be closed, that is,
each occurrence of any variable is bound to a (universal) quantifier. On the other hand, an
occurrence of a variable is free if it is not within the scope of any quantifier. An occurrence
of a variable is bounded if it is within the scope of a quantifier. A ground sentence is a
sentence without variables. An atomic wff is a positive literal and a negated atomic wff is
a negative literal.
To make a distinction among predicate symbols, constants and variables we will use the
Prolog notation [25], where predicates and constants are character strings beginning with
lowercase letters whereas variables are character strings beginning with uppercase letters.
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4.1. Different kinds of beliefs
If we use a propositional language, all beliefs have the same status.2 Every belief
is a symbolic notation that represents knowledge about the real world. However, with
a propositional language we cannot make a distinction among objects, functions and
relations between objects. Moreover, we cannot determine if a sentence is referred to an
object or a collection of objects.
Our proposal is to represent the knowledge with a richer language than the propositional
one, with the final goal of distinguishing between two kinds of beliefs:
Particular beliefs: These beliefs will be mainly represented by ground facts such as
bird(tweety), car(porsche), promoter(bill) or greater(3,2).
General beliefs: These beliefs are referred to collections of objects and they will be
general rules such as closed material implications. For instance, (∀X)(bird(X)→
flies(X)), (∀X)(quaker(X)→ pacifist(X)).
This distinction is context dependent and it could be modified in different frameworks.
Each belief base K has the form KP ∪KG where KP ∩KG = ∅. KP is the set of particular
sentences whereas KG is the set of general sentences. The same assumption will be made
in the explanations since they will contain particular and general sentences of the language.
Example 16. Let K =KP ∪KG be a belief base where:
KP =
{
ostr(jim),ostr(tom)},
KG =
{
(∀X)(ostr(X)→ bird(X)), (∀X)(bird(X)→ flies(X))}.
The ground logical consequences of this set are:
{
ostr(jim),ostr(tom),bird(jim),bird(tom),flies(jim),flies(tom)}.
Note that the individuals referenced in this set are relevant, that is, all individuals are
mentioned in the belief base. Suppose we receive the following explanation for¬flies(jim):
A= {ostr(jim), (∀X)(ostr(X)→¬flies(X))}.
We need to find the minimally inconsistent sets of K ∪A:
(1) {ostr(jim), (∀X)(ostr(X)→ bird(X)),
(∀X)(bird(X)→ flies(X)), (∀X)(ostr(X)→¬flies(X))}
(2) {ostr(tom), (∀X)(ostr(X)→ bird(X)),
(∀X)(bird(X)→ flies(X)), (∀X)(ostr(X)→¬flies(X))}.
Suppose we are making a kernel revision by a set of sentences. For that, we need an incision
function to make a cut upon every set. That is, we must decide which beliefs must be given
up in the revision process. A possible policy could be to discard particular beliefs; on the
2 The status is different and independent of other measures such as epistemic entrenchment, plausibility,
surprise value, acceptance degree or probability.
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other hand, we could discard general beliefs. If we choose the latter option we must decide
to give up at least one belief in the set:
{
(∀X)ostr(X)→ bird(X), (∀X)bird(X)→ flies(X), (∀X)ostr(X)→¬flies(X)}.
If we use the notion of specificity3 [19,24] we could keep the sentence:
(∀X)(ostr(X)→¬flies(X))
and eliminate at least one sentence of the remaining set of sentences. Suppose we give up
the sentence (∀X)(bird(X) → flies(X)). That is, σ((K ∪ A)⊥⊥⊥) = {(∀X)(bird(X)→
flies(X))}. The revised belief base, noted K◦σA, will be composed of the following
subsets:
K ′P =
{
ostr(jim),ostr(tom)},
K ′G =
{
(∀X)(ostr(X)→ bird(X)), (∀X)(ostr(X)→¬flies(X))}.
The ground logical consequences of the revised belief base are:
{
ostr(jim),ostr(tom),bird(jim),bird(tom),¬flies(jim),¬flies(tom)}.
Example 17. Let K =KP ∪KG be a belief base such that:
KP =
{
bird(tweety),peng(opus)
}
,
KG =
{
(∀X)(peng(X)→ bird(X)), (∀X)(bird(X)→ flies(X))}.
The ground logical consequences of K are:
{
bird(tweety),peng(opus),flies(tweety),bird(opus),flies(opus)}.
Suppose we receive the following explanation for ¬flies(opus):
A= {bird(opus),peng(opus), (∀X)(bird(X)∧ peng(X)→¬flies(X))}.
Suppose we are making a kernel revision by a set of sentences. We need to find the
minimally inconsistent sets of K ∪A. The sets in these conditions are:
(1) {bird(opus),peng(opus), (∀X)(bird(X)∧ peng(X)→¬flies(X))}∪
{(∀X)(bird(X)→ flies(X))}.
(2) {peng(opus), (∀X)(peng(X)→ bird(X)), (∀X)(bird(X)→ flies(X))}∪
{(∀X)(bird(X)∧ peng(X)→¬flies(X))}.
If we choose to discard general beliefs, we must give up at least one sentence of every set:
• {(∀X)(bird(X)∧ peng(X)→¬flies(X)), (∀X)(bird(X)→ flies(X))}.
• {(∀X)(peng(X)→ bird(X)), (∀X)(bird(X)∧ peng(X)→¬flies(X))}∪
{(∀X)(bird(X)→ flies(X))}.
3 Informally, {a ∧ b→ c} (based on the facts a and b) is more specific than {a→¬c} (just based on the fact
a). On the other hand, {p→ r} (based on p and one rule) is more specific than {p→ q,q →¬r} (based on p
and two rules). A formal definition of specifity can be found in Section 6.
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Since (∀X)(bird(X)→ flies(X)) is a common member of these two sets, we could discard
it. That is, σ((K ∪A)⊥⊥⊥)= {(∀X)(bird(X)→ flies(X))}. The revised belief base, noted
K◦σA, will be composed of the following sets:
K ′P =
{
bird(tweety),bird(opus),peng(opus)
}
,
K ′G =
{
(∀X)(peng(X)→ bird(X)), (∀X)(bird(X)∧ peng(X)→¬flies(X))}.
The ground logical consequences of the revised belief base are:
{
bird(tweety),bird(opus),peng(opus),¬flies(opus)}.
In this example we can see that while we have lost some knowledge, i.e., the rule
regarding the flying capabilities of birds, we have learned about an exception, i.e., penguins
are birds that do not fly and this discovery is precluding us from maintaining a useful
general rule. However, we could improve the outcome if we preserve retracted beliefs with
a different status according to the mechanism we will present in the next sections.
5. Conditionals and belief revision
In this section we will consider different kinds of conditionals and how they can be used
in a belief revision system. We will briefly present three main kinds of conditionals, their
properties and their use in knowledge representation. Every conditional contains two well
distinguished parts: the antecedent and the consequent. We will study two inference rules
on conditionals: modus ponens and antecedent strengthening.
The material conditionals are referred to material implications in most classical logic
systems. This type of conditional has the form α→ β and it allows making inferences in
different directions. For instance, from α and α → β we may obtain β applying modus
ponens. On the other hand, from ¬β and α → β we may infer ¬α applying modus
tolens. Moreover, the material conditionals satisfy antecedent strengthening (if α → β
then α ∧ δ → β .) This property of material conditionals makes them difficult to use in
knowledge representation.
A counterfactual conditional is a sentence of the form α>β where normally the premise
α is either undetermined or rejected (i.e., expected to be false). The counterfactuals have
been studied by Lewis [16] and Ginsberg [8]. Each sentence α>β is interpreted as “if
it were the case that α then β would be the case”. The counterfactual conditionals satisfy
modus ponens but not antecedent strengthening. If we analyze counterfactuals by means of
a truth table we could ensure that, if the antecedent is true then the conditional truth value
is equal to the consequent truth value. However, the truth of the counterfactual depends
upon more than merely the truth or falsity of the components. Counterfactuals assume the
existence of a sphere system centered on a single world i that represents the real world.
This is one of most important differences between the model for belief revision proposed
by Grove [9] which is a sphere system centered in a set of worlds: the worlds in which the
belief set K holds.
Defeasible conditionals are conditionals in which, if the antecedent is true then
“normally” the consequent is true. The sentence α >−β is interpreted as “if α holds
18 M.A. Falappa et al. / Artificial Intelligence 141 (2002) 1–28
then normally β holds” or “if α is true then usually β is true”. For instance, if b(X) is
interpreted as “X is a bird” and f (X) is interpreted as “X flies” then a conditional of
the form b(X) >−f (X) is interpreted as: “every individual X that is a bird is normally a
flying individual”. However, if we believe that Poly is a bird we cannot conclude that Poly
flies (i.e., we cannot apply modus ponens in the strong sense). The reason for this is that
a defeasible conditional does not allow “skipping” from the antecedent to the consequent
since it is a general rule that holds in normal conditions, although it is not easy to determine
when. Defeasible conditionals do not satisfy antecedent strengthening. That is, from α >−δ
it is not possible to infer α ∧ β >−δ. In general, they are used as inference rules instead of
language objects, that is, they are on the metalevel. For instance, the default rules proposed
by Reiter [21] are an example of the use of defeasible conditionals as inference rules. The
general form of a default rule is α:β
δ
and it is interpreted as: if α is true and β may be
consistently assumed then δ is concluded. Among default rules, there is a more specific
subclass, called normal default rules, and they are of the form α:β
β
. A typical example of
this kind of rule is:
bird(X) : flies(X)
flies(X) .
In other words, for every individual X which is a bird and it can be consistently assumed
that it flies, X is a flying individual.
A formalism in which defeasible conditionals are used as inference rules are the
argumentative systems [20,23,24,26]. In these systems, each sentence of the form α >−β is
a tentative inference rule that can be used to obtain new conclusions. Next we will present
a revision operator that generates defeasible conditionals from a revision operator upon
belief bases represented in a first order language.
5.1. Generating defeasible conditionals by means of revisions
Here we will study the generation of defeasible conditionals from a process of belief
revision. That idea was formally introduced by Alchourrón [2] upon modal systems and by
Falappa and Simari [5] upon knowledge based systems.
Suppose that, in a revision process, we eliminate a conditional sentence of the form
∀(X)(α(X)→ β(X)). This sentence ensures that any object X satisfying the relation α is
an object satisfying the relation β . It can also express that any object satisfying the relation
¬β is an object satisfying the relation ¬α. If we eliminate such a sentence surely we have
received new information inconsistent with it and which is more important. Therefore, one
of the following cases may occur:
(1) We have received information regarding some individual satisfying the relation α but
not satisfying β .
(2) We have received information regarding some individual satisfying the relation¬β but
not satisfying ¬α.
In this case, we could discard the refuted rule because we have accepted that it has an
exception. We will resume Example 17 in which this policy produces too much loss of
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information. From the revised set we cannot infer that Tweety flies because we do not have
the rule establishing that all birds fly anymore. A way to conclude that Tweety flies could
be to use a defeasible conditional (in a disjoint set from the original) determining that, if X
is a bird and there is no evidence against the fact that Tweety flies, then we can conclude
that Tweety is able to do it. This can be represented by the default rule:
bird(X) : flies(X)
flies(X)
or by a defeasible rule such as bird(X) >−flies(X) in argumentative systems. Next, we
will present a framework to define a revision operator by a set of sentences that generates
defeasible conditionals by product of a revision process.
5.2. Belief revision in argumentative systems
From now on, the epistemic state of an agent will be represented by a tuple of the form
[[K,∆]] (called knowledge structure) where K is a subset of L+ and ∆ is a set of the form:
∆= {α >−β: α,β ∈L+}.
Each sentence of K is a well formed formula in L+ and it contains those sentences
undefeasible in one moment of time. The set K is called strong or undefeasible knowledge
and it is split into two sets KP and KG such that KP represents particular knowledge, KG
represents general knowledge, K =KP ∪KG and KP ∩KG = ∅. On the other hand, each
sentence in ∆ is a defeasible conditional representing a tentative inference rule to handle
incomplete information. The set ∆ is called defeasible knowledge. The idea is that, some
defeasible rule of the form α >−β in ∆ is the transformation of some rule α→ β previously
included in the strong knowledge but eliminated by some change operator. Instead of fully
eliminating that sentence, we propose to preserve a syntactic transformation of it in a
different set.
Definition 18. Let δ = (∀X1 . . .Xn)α → β be a material implication in L+. A positive
transformation of δ, noted by T +(δ), is a sentence of the form α >−β ; a negative
transformation of δ, noted by T −(δ), is a sentence of the form ¬β >−¬α.
Different from material implications, variables in defeasible conditionals are considered
free. The way in which a defeasible conditional of the form α >−β is interpreted is:
“reasons to believe in the antecedent α provide reasons to believe in the consequent β”.
Now, we will define a revision operator upon a knowledge structure.
Definition 19. Let [[K,∆]] be a knowledge structure, “◦” an operator of kernel (partial
meet) revision by a set of sentences for K and A a set of sentences. The kernel (partial
meet) composed revision of [[K,∆]] with respect to A is defined as [[K,∆]]%A= [[K ′,∆′]]
such that K ′ =K◦A and ∆′ =∆∪∆′1 ∪∆′2 where:
∆′1 =
{
true >−α: α ∈ (KP \K◦A)
}
,
∆′2 =
{
T +(α): α ∈ (KG \K◦A)
}∪ {T −(α): α ∈ (KG \K◦A)
}
.
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The set K ′ contains the revised undefeasible beliefs, ∆′1 is the transformation in
defeasible rules of particular beliefs (also called assumptions [10]) eliminated from K
whereas ∆′2 is the transformation of general beliefs eliminated from K into defeasible
rules.
6. Argumentative systems
Here we will introduce argumentative systems as in [23,24], we will define the new
epistemic model and we will show some examples of the application of the composed
revision.
The derivations in argumentative systems make use of some ground instances (i.e.,
without free variables) of defeasible rules in ∆. So we will use the set ∆↓ of all ground
instances of members of ∆ produced by replacing consistently all variables by constants
in L+.
Typically, argumentative systems use sets of undefeasible and defeasible beliefs. In
other words, they use a knowledge structure [[K,∆]] such that K represents undefeasible
beliefs whereas ∆ represents defeasible beliefs.
Given a sentence α ∈ L and a set Γ = {α1, α2, . . . , αn} where each αi is a sentence
in K or a member of ∆↓, a meta-meta-relationship “ |∼ ”, called defeasible consequence
between Γ and α is established as follows [23,24].
Definition 20. Let Γ ⊆K ∪∆↓. A ground literal α ∈L+ is a defeasible consequence of a
set Γ if and only if there is some sequence β1, β2, . . . , βm such that βm = α and, for any i ,
βi ∈ Γ or βi is a direct consequence of the preceding members of the sequence using
modus ponens, weak detachment4 or instantiation of a universally quantified sentence or
an instance of an axiom in L+. The notation Γ |∼α is an abbreviation of α is a defeasible
consequence of Γ .
We can use the notation α1, . . . , αn |∼α instead of {α1, . . . , αn} |∼α, or K ∪ T |∼α
making the distinction between defeasible and undefeasible sentences used in the explicit
derivation, where T ⊆ ∆↓. The defeasible inference relation allows the definition of a
defeasible consequence operator C as C(Γ )= {α: Γ |∼α}. This operator is nonmonotonic
since some derivations can be invalidated on the arrival of new pieces of information. That
is so because defeasible rules belonging to each (defeasible) derivation can be invalidated
if the undefeasible knowledge is modified.
Different from classical logic systems, the conclusions in argumentative systems are
tentative, so we need some selection mechanism or preference criteria among arguments.
First, we will introduce the notion of argument in order to define a preference criteria
among them.
4 Weak detachment is like modus ponens but using “>−” instead of “→”.
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Definition 21 (Simari and Loui [24]). Given a knowledge structure [[K,∆]] we say that
a subset T of ∆↓ is an argument for a ground literal α ∈ L+ in the context K , noted by
〈T ,α〉, if and only if:
(1) K ∪ T |∼α.
(2) K ∪ T |∼⊥.
(3) There is no T ′ ⊂ T such that K ∪ T ′ |∼α.
The concept of an argument is similar to the concept of an explanation. However, the
first one is defined in terms of a defeasible inference relation and uses context knowledge,
whereas the second one is defined in terms of a classical inference relation.
Definition 22 (Simari and Loui [24]). Let 〈T ,α〉 be an argument for α in a context K . We
say that 〈S,β〉 is a subargument of 〈T ,α〉 if and only if 〈S,β〉 is an argument for β and
S ⊆ T . This relation is noted as 〈S,β〉 ⊆ 〈T ,α〉, overloading the inclusion symbol upon
sets.
Proposition 23 (Simari and Loui [24]). Every argument 〈T ,α〉 contains the following
trivial subarguments: 〈T ,α〉 and 〈∅, β〉 for any β ∈ Cn(K).
Definition 24 (Simari and Loui [24]). Given two arguments 〈T1, α1〉 and 〈T2, α2〉 we say
that they are in disagreement, noted by 〈T1, α1〉 %& 〈T2, α2〉, if and only if K∪{α1, α2}  ⊥.
Definition 25 [23,24]. An argument 〈T1, α1〉 counterargues to 〈T2, α2〉 at a literal α, noted
by 〈T1, α1〉⊗ α−→〈T2, α2〉, if and only if, there is some subargument 〈T ,α〉 of 〈T2, α2〉 such
that 〈T1, α1〉 %& 〈T ,α〉.
Since argument conclusions are tentative we can have situations in which there are
arguments with contradictory conclusions. In such case, it is necessary to get a preference
criteria. For instance, we will use the criteria of specificity introduced by Poole [19].
Definition 26 (Poole [19], Simari and Loui [24]). Let 〈T1, α1〉 and 〈T2, α2〉 be two
arguments in the context K . We say that 〈T1, α1〉 is strictly more specific than 〈T2, α2〉,
noted by 〈T1, α1〉(spec〈T2, α2〉, if and only if:
(1) For any ground literal β ∈ L+ such that KG ∪ {β} ∪ T1 |∼α1 and KG ∪ {β} |∼α1 then
KG ∪ {β} ∪ T2 |∼α2.
(2) There is a ground literal δ ∈L+ such that
(a) KG ∪ {δ} ∪ T2 |∼α2 (activates T2).
(b) KG ∪ {δ} |∼α2 (nontriviality condition).
(c) KG ∪ {δ} ∪ T1 |∼α1 (does not activate T1).
The term activates is used with the following meaning: together with KG the argument Ti
is enough to construct a defeasible derivation of αj .
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Definition 27 [23,24]. Given two arguments 〈T1, α1〉 and 〈T2, α2〉 we say that 〈T1, α1〉
defeats 〈T2, α2〉 at a literal α, noted by 〈T1, α1〉)def〈T2, α2〉, if and only if there is a
subargument 〈T ,α〉 of 〈T2, α2〉 such that:
Proper Defeater: 〈T1, α1〉(spec〈T ,α〉; or
Blocking Defeater: 〈T1, α1〉 is incomparable (by specificity) to 〈T ,α〉.
Example 28. Given K = KP ∪ KG where KP = {h(o),p(t)} and KG = {(∀X)p(X)→
b(X), (∀X)h(X)→ b(X)}, and the set of defeasible conditionals:5
∆= {b(X) >−f (X),p(X) ∧ b(X) >−¬f (X), b(X)∧ f (X) >−w(X)}.
We have the following relations between arguments:
• Argument:
〈{
b(o) >−f (o), b(o)∧ f (o) >−w(o)},w(o)〉.
• Disagreement:
〈{
p(t) ∧ b(t) >−¬f (t)},¬f (t)〉 %& 〈{b(t) >−f (t)}, f (t)〉.
• Counterargument:
〈{
p(t) ∧ b(t) >−¬f (t)},¬f (t)〉
⊗f (t)−→〈{b(t) >−f (t), b(t)∧ f (t) >−w(t)},w(t)〉.
• More specific:
〈{
p(t) ∧ b(t) >−¬f (t)},¬f (t)〉(spec
〈{
b(t) >−f (t)}, f (t)〉.
• Defeat:
〈{
p(t) ∧ b(t) >−¬f (t)},¬f (t)〉
)def
〈{
b(t) >−f (t), b(t)∧ f (t) >−w(t)},w(t)〉.
Definition 29 [23]. Let 〈T ,α〉 be an argument for α in the context K . We say that
〈T ,α〉 is a justification for α if for any counterargument 〈S,β〉 of 〈T ,α〉 it holds that
〈T ,α〉)def〈S,β〉.
From now on, the notation [[K,∆]]  α is referred to a classical derivation of α since
it only uses sentences of K . On the other hand, the notation [[K,∆]] |∼α is referred to a
derivation of α using ground instances of sentences in ∆.
Example 30. In Example 17 we have the set K =KP ∪KG such that:
KP =
{
bird(tweety),peng(opus)
}
,
KG =
{
(∀X)(peng(X)→ bird(X)), (∀X)(bird(X)→ flies(X))}.
5 Literals: o= opus and t = tweety. Predicates: p= penguin, b= bird, h= hawk, f = flies and w= winged.
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Suppose that the knowledge structure is [[K,∆]] where ∆= ∅. In this case we have that:
C([[K,∆]])= {bird(tweety),peng(opus),bird(opus),flies(tweety),flies(opus)}.
The set of defeasible consequences of [[K,∆]] is equal to the set of logical consequences
of K since the set of defeasible rules is empty. Then, we receive the explanation for
¬flies(opus):
A= {bird(opus),peng(opus), (∀X)(bird(X)∧ peng(X)→¬flies(X))}
and we obtain a new belief base K ′ =K◦A=K ′P ∪K ′G such that:
K ′P =
{
bird(tweety),bird(opus),peng(opus)
}
,
K ′G =
{
(∀X)(peng(X)→ bird(X)), (∀X)(bird(X)∧ peng(X)→¬flies(X))}.
However, the sentences erased are not fully forgotten but they are stored (transformed) as
defeasible rules. That is, the new knowledge structure is [[K ′,∆′]] = [[K,∆]] % A where
K ′ =K◦A and:
∆′ = {bird(X) >−flies(X),¬flies(X) >−¬bird(X)}.
Then, we have the following defeasible conclusions:
C([[K ′,∆′]])= {bird(tweety),bird(opus),peng(opus),¬flies(opus),flies(tweety)}.
The last literal is derived using defeasible rules. In other words, using defeasible rules we
can extend the conclusions inferred using classical consequence.
6.1. Epistemic model
Now we will define the new set of epistemic attitudes. Let [[K,∆]] be a knowledge
structure and α a ground literal in L+. The possible epistemic attitudes towards α are:
(1) Acceptance: If there is a justification 〈T ,α〉.
(2) Rejection: If for any possible argument 〈T ,α〉 there is at least an undefeated proper
defeater of 〈T ,α〉.
(3) Indeterminate: If there is no argument 〈T ,α〉.
(4) Indefinite: If for any possible argument 〈T ,α〉 there is no undefeated proper defeater
of 〈T ,α〉 but there is at least an undefeated blocking defeater of 〈T ,α〉.
Now, we will give a test for defeasible conditionals assuming the existence of a revision
operator upon a knowledge structure and considering defeasible conditionals as a meta-
linguistic relation, not as a connective of the object language.
Test for defeasible conditionals. α(X) >−β(X) ∈ [[K,∆]] % A if and only if α(X)>−
β(X) ∈∆ or (∀X)(α(X)→ β(X)) ∈K and [[K,∆]] % A  α(t) ∧¬β(t) for some ground
term t .
Note that this test for defeasible conditionals is formulated in terms of a classical
inference relation “”. The idea is the following: a defeasible conditional α >−β belongs
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to the revised knowledge structure if and only if it was in the original knowledge structure
or α→ β was in K but not in the revised undefeasible knowledge.
Example 31. Suppose we have the knowledge structure [[K0,∆0] where:
K0 =
{
p(a),p(b),p(c),p(d), q(a), q(b), (∀X)p(X)→ s(X), (∀X)q(X)→ t (X)},
∆0 = ∅.
The ground sentences inferred from this belief base are:
{
p(a),p(b),p(c),p(d), q(a), q(b), s(a), s(b), s(c), s(d), t (a), t (b)
}
.
At some given instant, we receive the following explanation A0 for ¬s(a):
{
p(a), q(a), (∀X)(p(X)∧ q(X))→¬s(X)}.
If we are making a kernel revision by a set of sentences we must give up the minimally
inconsistent subsets ofK0∪A0. That is, we must cut every set in (K0∪A0)⊥⊥⊥= {H1,H2}
where:
H1 =
{
p(a), q(a), (∀X)(p(X) ∧ q(X))→¬s(X), (∀X)p(X)→ s(X)},
H2 =
{
p(b), q(b), (∀X)(p(X) ∧ q(X))→¬s(X), (∀X)p(X)→ s(X)}.
We can eliminate one of the common rules to cut both minimally entailment sets.
Suppose that the belief (∀X)(p(X) ∧ q(X))→ ¬s(X) is better or more plausible than
(∀X)p(X) → s(X). Then, the new knowledge structure is [[K1,∆1]] = [[K0,∆0] % A0
where:
K1 =
{
p(a),p(b),p(c),p(d), q(a), q(b), (∀X)(p(X)∧ q(X))→¬s(X),
(∀X)q(X)→ t (X)},
∆1 =
{
p(X) >−s(X),¬s(X) >−¬p(X)}.
Note that in this knowledge structure we can infer the ground sentences:
{
p(a),p(b),p(c),p(d), q(a), q(b),¬s(a),¬s(b), t (a), t (b)}.
However, we believe in p(c) and p(d) but we cannot conclude classically s(c) and s(d)
although these sentences are consistent with K1. If we use the defeasible rule p(X) >−s(X)
we can see that there are justifications for s(c) and s(d). Therefore, s(c) and s(d) will be
accepted in the revised knowledge structure.
Example 32. Consider the knowledge structure produced in the above example. At some
point, we receive the following explanation A1 for s(a):
{
p(a), q(a), u(a), (∀X)(p(X)∧ q(X)∧ u(X))→ s(X)}.
Now, we must eliminate the minimally inconsistent sets of K1 ∪A1. The one set in this
condition is:
{
p(a), q(a), u(a), (∀X)(p(X)∧ q(X)∧ u(X))→ s(X),
(∀X)(p(X)∧ q(X))→¬s(X)}.
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If the new rule is considered better than the sentence in K1 then the revised knowledge
structure is: [[K2,∆2] = [[K1,∆1]] % A1 where:
K2 =
{
p(a),p(b),p(c),p(d), q(a), q(b), u(a)
}
∪ {(∀X)(p(X)∧ q(X)∧ u(X))→ s(X), (∀X)q(X)→ t (X)},
∆2 =
{
p(X) >−s(X),¬s(X) >−¬p(X)}
∪ {(p(X) ∧ q(X))>−¬s(X), s(x) >−(¬p(X)∨¬q(X))}.
In this knowledge structure we can infer the following ground sentences:
{
p(a),p(b),p(c),p(d), q(a), q(b), u(a), s(a), t (a), t (b)
}
.
The defeasible ground consequences of this set are: {s(b), s(c), s(d),¬s(b)}. Again,
we have extended the set of ground conclusions. But in this case we can (defeasibily)
infer either s(b) or ¬s(b) since we can construct the arguments 〈{p(b) >−s(b)}, s(b)〉 and
〈{(p(b)∧ q(b)) >−¬s(b)},¬s(b)〉. Since the argumentative systems can treat this kind
of contradictions (by means of a preference relation between arguments) it could be the
case that one argument defeats another. Using the specificity criteria proposed in [19,24]
we could conclude that the argument for ¬s(b) defeats the argument for s(b). Therefore,
¬s(b) will be accepted in the knowledge structure.
It is easy to check that the test for defeasible conditionals is satisfied in both examples.
6.2. Which beliefs should be revised?
A revision operator can modify either the undefeasible or the defeasible knowledge.
The main problem is to determine when some piece of information is undefeasible
or defeasible. A simple solution could be to incorporate knowledge directly upon the
defeasible knowledge. But this solution is too simple and it is not very realistic. In our
perspective, the qualification of the knowledge is dynamic, that is, it evolves with time and
the incorporation of new information. When an agent incorporates knowledge it typically
incorporates it into its undefeasible knowledge. But, should it be possible to consider
this new knowledge as defeasible knowledge if it were not actually so? Our position is
that the knowledge is undefeasible until we discover new information inconsistent with
it. That is, suppose we believe undefeasibly that all private enterprizes give an optimal
service (α = (∀X)(enterprise(X) ∧ private(X)) → good service(X)). Then we receive
new information saying that private enterprizes with foreign capitals provide a bad service
(β = (∀X)(enterprise(X) ∧ private(X) ∧ foreigner(X))→¬good service(X)). And we
receive new information saying that unicom is a phone company with foreign capitals, its
rate is very high and the service is not very good. At this moment we change the status of
the belief. In other words, we will believe undefeasibly in each belief until we note new and
more plausible information in contradiction with them. In this case, we do not undefeasibly
believe in α. We will undefeasibly believe in β (since it is more specific than α) and α could
be considered as a tentative belief. That is, for every private enterprize with foreign capitals
we will believe that it does not provide a good service. On the other hand, for those private
enterprizes with unknown source of capital we could believe that they give a good service.
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This intuition is modelled with the revision operator by a set of sentences upon
defeasible systems. Suppose that [[K,∆]] represents the epistemic state of an agent. After
the revision with respect to some explanans A we modify the undefeasible knowledge
by a nonprioritized revision operator. However, those sentences eliminated in the revision
process are not fully discarded, but stored as tentative rules (with a different status). This
mechanism has two advantages:
(1) Dynamic classification of beliefs: classify beliefs dynamically as undefeasible or
defeasible.
(2) Minimal change: preserve as much old information as possible.
The idea of minimal change is one of the main principles of theory change. The
concept of dynamic classification has been frequently used in the evolution of humanity’s
knowledge. For instance, the belief establishing that all metals are solid under normal
conditions of temperature and pressure was undefeasible for years (maybe centuries).
However, at some point, it was discovered that mercury is a metal in liquid state under
said conditions. Precisely at this moment the status of the belief about the solidity property
of metals was modified. By analogy, at some moment we believed that the freezing
temperature of water was 0◦ Celsius. This belief was undefeasible until it was discovered
that this property holds only under normal conditions of pressure. If the pressure is high,
the freezing point could be a lower temperature. Therefore, a more specific rule was found
for determining the exact freezing point of water. On the other hand, the belief saying that
the freezing temperature of water is 0◦ Celsius could be viewed as a default rule that holds
within “normal” worlds.
At the base of the above reasoning, we think that beliefs (rules, facts, defaults, argu-
ments) are dynamically classified as undefeasible or defeasible by successive revisions.
Someone could believe that it would be simpler to incorporate beliefs directly upon the de-
feasible knowledge. However, this policy could decrease the inference power of an agent.
Consider the following example. Think of a rule of the kind is-a (very often used in data-
base relationships), for instance (∀X)argentinian(X)→ south american(X). This rule rep-
resents an is-a relationship: every Argentinean is a South American. Moreover, if we know
that John is not a South American we can conclude that John is not an Argentinean. This
conclusion is not possible if the above rule were defeasible.
We could think that every is-a rule is an undefeasible one. However, is-a rules are not
the only undefeasible rules. Many prototypical properties of objects are undefeasible too.
For instance, every man has a heart as vital organ. This rule is not an is-a rule and it makes
reference to properties of the object man. Therefore, we are giving one more argument to
treat knowledge as undefeasible until we discover new and better information.
7. Conclusions
We have presented a new kind of nonprioritized revision operator based on the use
of explanations. The idea is that an agent, before incorporating information which is
inconsistent with its knowledge, requests an explanation supporting it. We distinguish two
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parts in every explanation: an explanans, represented by set of sentences supporting some
belief, and an explanandum, which is the final conclusion. We present a deductive notion
of explanation, giving some postulates for it.
We propose that every explanation contains rules and particular knowledge. If the
sentences in the explanans are better or more plausible than the sentences in the original
belief base, then the explanation is incorporated. We have defined two kinds of revision
operator: kernel and partial meet revision by a set of sentences. These operators may
partially accept the new information and we give representation theorems for them.
Finally, we presented a framework oriented to defeasible reasoning. We showed how
defeasible conditionals can be generated using the revision operator by a set of sentences
upon knowledge structures. This approach is sound because it preserves consistency in the
undefeasible knowledge and it provides a mechanism to dynamically qualify the beliefs as
undefeasible or defeasible. Moreover, it provides a more complete set of epistemic attitudes
and extends the inference power of knowledge based systems.
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